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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher Briggs appeals from the district courfs appellate decision affirming 
his judgment of conviction for second degree stalking, arguing that the magistrate court 
improperly instructed the jury. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Due to his nonconsensual harassing of Cassandra Menear, the state charged 
Briggs with second degree stalking. (R., pp.82-83.) Briggs went to trial. (See Tr.) At 
the close of trial, the jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Stalking, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about April 1st, 2009, through June 1st, 2009 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Christopher Briggs 
4. knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course of conduct that 
seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed Cassandra Menear, 
and was such as would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress, OR 
5. engaged in a course of conduct such as would cause a 
reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in 
fear of the death or physical injury of a family member. 
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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(Instruction No.12, R., p.75 (emphasis original).) The magistrate also offered some 
definitions in the jury's instructions as follows: 
'Harassed' means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed 
at a specific person which seriously alarmed or annoyed the person, and 
which served no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must have 
been such as would have caused a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress. 
'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a 
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity 
of purpose. Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected 
activity. 
'Nonconsensual contact' means any contact with the victim that is 
initiated or continued without the victim's consent, that is beyond the scope 
of the consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim's 
expressed desire that the contact by avoided or discontinued. 
'Nonconsensual contacf' includes, but is not limited to: 
1. Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by 
electronic means, on the victim; 
2. Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property; 
3. Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; 
4. Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or 
occupied by the victim; 
5. Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim's 
telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of 
whether a conversation ensues; 
6. Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or 
7. Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, 
leased or occupied by the victim. 
(Instruction No.13, R., p.76.) No party objected to the courfs instructions. (See R., 
p.114; see also Tr., p.169, L.6-p.170, L.10.) After deliberations, the jury returned a 
guilty verdict against Briggs. (R., p.59.) 
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After dismissing the jury, the magistrate court noted that its definitions instruction 
for"course of conducf'did not track the amended statute and expressed its concern that 
there was a "decent likelihood that the jury ha[d] been misinstructed in this case:· (See 
Tr., p.203, L.14-p.205, L.5.) Briggs moved for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 34 and Idaho Code § 19-2406(5), asserting that the magistrate improperly 
instructed the jury by omitting "nonconsensual acts' from its definition of "course of 
conduct' as it applied to the stalking charge. (R., pp.90-95.) The state objected to 
Briggs' motion, asserting, inter alia, that because Briggs did not object to the instructions 
before the jury retired, he was required to establish fundamental error, which the state 
argued he failed to do. (R., pp.99-109.) 
After a hearing on the motion (R., p.110), the magistrate denied Briggs' motion, 
ruling that any error in the instructions regarding the omission of nonconsensual acts 
from the definitions instruction was harmless because nonconsensual acts were both 
the exclusive basis for the state's allegations and all the evidence which it presented at 
trial (R., pp.113-18). The magistrate entered a judgment of conviction against Briggs 
(R., pp.123-24), and Briggs timely appealed to the district court (R., pp.125-28). The 
district court upheld the magistrate courfs decision and affirmed the judgment against 
Briggs. (R., pp.210-23.) Briggs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.225-27.) 
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ISSUES 
Briggs states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the magistrate court improperly instruct and mislead the jury as 
to the elements of the crime? 
2. Were the jury instructions so fundamentally flawed to deprive 
Briggs of a fair trial without the protections afforded by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of 
the Idaho Constitution? 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Briggs failed to establish fundamental error in the magistrate court's omission of 
'honconsensual acts' from the definition of "course of conduct' as that term applies to 
second degree stalking, where "nonconsensual acts' were defined in the jury instructions 
and the uncontested, overwhelming evidence against Briggs showed that he had 
committed nonconsensual acts. Has Briggs therefore failed to show any basis for 
reversal of the magistrate's order denying his motion for a new trial? 
2. Briggs failed to raise the issue of fundamental error in the lack of a jury 
instruction defining "constitutionally protected activity' to the district court acting as the 
intermediate appellate court. Having failed to raise the issue to the intermediate 
appellate court, has Briggs waived the issue? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Briggs Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions' Definition Of 
Course Of Conduct Entitling Him To Reversal Of The Magistrate's Order Denying His 
Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
In its definitions instruction, the magistrate court omitted "nonconsensual acts' 
from its definition of "oourse of conduct:' (R., p.76.) Briggs did not object to the jury 
instruction. (See Tr., p.169, L.9-p.170, L.10.) After the jury returned its verdict, Briggs 
moved for a mistrial, later recast as a motion for new trial, on the basis that the jury had 
been improperly instructed. (Tr., p.205, Ls.20-24; R., pp.90-95.) The magistrate court 
denied Briggs' motion, finding that any error in the jury instructions was harmless. (R., 
pp.113-18.) 
On appeal, Briggs argues that the omission from the definition constituted 
fundamental error and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial. (Appellanfs brief, 
pp.11-17 .) Briggs failed to establish fundamental error because the omission from the 
definition, unlike omitting an element of the crime, did not relieve the state of its duty to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime; viewed in the 
context of the whole jury instructions, it is not clear that the omission would mislead the 
jury; and considering the overwhelming and uncontested evidence establishing that 
Briggs' actions were nonconsensual, he was not ultimately prejudiced by the omission. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a matter of law. 
I.C. § 19-2406(5). Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the trial court's 
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discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v. 
Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 143, 
145, 128 P.3d 960, 962 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In this case, the motion for a new trial turned upon the propriety of a jury 
instruction. Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a partY:' State v. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). 
C. Briggs Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Magistrate Courfs 
Instructions To The Jury 
'tt is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal:' State v. Carlson, 134 
Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 
P.3d at 865 ('An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal:) 
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same 
principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ('No party may 
assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection:); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
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review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. ~; see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Briggs did not object to the magistrate's instructions before the jury retired to 
consider its verdict. Thus, to prevail on his motion for a new trial predicated on his claim 
of instructional error, Briggs was required to establish that the complained of instruction 
rose to the level of fundamental error. Review under the fundamental error doctrine 
required Briggs to demonstrate the error he alleged: "(1) violate[d] one or more of [his] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exist[ed] (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless:· Perry, 150 
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to Briggs' claim of 
instructional error shows that the district court correctly held that Briggs failed to 
demonstrate fundamental error entitling him to a new trial. Briggs has therefore failed to 
establish a basis for reversal of the magistrate's order denying his motion for a new trial. 
The state charged Briggs with second degree stalking. (R., pp.82-83.) The 
magistrate court instructed the jury as to the elements of that crime as follows: 
Instruction No. 12: In order for the defendant to be guilty of stalking, the 
State must prove each of the following: Number 1 ... on or about April 1st, 
2009 through June 1st, 2009; No. 2, in the state of Idaho; No. 3, the 
defendant, Christopher Briggs; No. 4, knowingly and maliciously engaged 
in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed 
Cassandra Menear and such as would cause a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress, or engaged in a course of conduct such as 
would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury 
or .. .in fear of the death of [sic] physical injury of a family member. If each 
of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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(Tr., p.172, L.11-p.173, L.2; see also Instruction No.12, R., p.75.) 
Because jury instructions that relieve the state of its duty to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of a crime violate a defendanfs right to due 
process, jury instructions that omit a contested, essential element of the crime rise to 
the level of fundamental error. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (citing 
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 773, 749, 
170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)). The magistrate's instruction, however, does not omit any of 
the crime's essential elements, nor does it relieve the state of its duty to prove those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C. § 18-7906. In fact, Briggs does not 
argue that the above elements instruction omits any essential, contested element of the 
crime of stalking; nor does he argue that the instruction relieved the state of its 
obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. 
Rather, Briggs' argument on appeal is that the magistrate court committed fundamental 
error by omitting "nonconsensual contact' from the definition of "course of conduct' in the 
magistrate's definitions instruction. (Appellanfs brief, pp.15-17.) 
The definitions instruction offered by the magistrate court was as follows: 
Instruction No. 13: Harassed means a knowing and willful course 
of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarmed or 
annoyed the person and which served no legitimate purpose. The course 
of conduct must have been such as would have caused a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. 
Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a 
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity 
of purpose. Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected 
activity. 
Nonconsensual contact means any contact with the victim that is 
initiated or continued without the victim's consent, that is beyond the scope 
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of the consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim's 
expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. 
Nonconsensual contact includes but is not limited to, No. 1, 
following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by electronic 
means on the victim; No. 2, contacting the victim in a public place or on 
private property; No. 3, appearing at the workplace or residence of the 
victim; No. 4, entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or 
occupied by the victim; No. 5, contacting the victim by telephone or 
causing the victim's telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously 
regardless of whether a conversation ensues; No. 6, sending mail or 
electronic communications to the victim; or, number seven, placing an 
object on or delivering an object to property owned, leased or occupied by 
the victim. 
(Tr., p.173, L.3-p.174, L.9; see also Instruction No.13, R., p.76.) Idaho Code§ 18-
7906, however, defines "course of conduct' as follows: 
[R]epeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family 
or household member of the victim, provided however, that constitutionally 
protected activity is not included within the meaning of this definition. 
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). 
The state acknowledges that the magistrate courfs outdated definition for"course 
of conduct' omitted the aspect of"nonconsensual contact:' This, however, is not an error 
of constitutional dimension: The magistrate courfs omission from the definition did not 
omit an essential element of the crime, nor did it alter the state's burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of the crime. Because 
Briggs failed to show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, he failed to 
establish fundamental error. 
Even assuming some constitutionally significant error, Briggs cannot show that 
the error clearly misled the jury as to the elements of the crime or the state's burden of 
proof. First, "nonconsensual contact' was separately defined by the magistrate court, 
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even if omitted from the definition for"course of conduct:' Second, in the context of the 
jury instructions and trial record, the term "course of conduct' required "a course of 
conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed;' or "would cause a reasonable 
person to be in fear of death or physical injury:' (Instruction No.12, R., p.75 (emphasis 
added).) As generally understood, actions that cause serious alarm, annoyance, or 
harassment, or cause someone to reasonably be in fear of death or injury, already 
contemplate a lack of consent. It is well established that jury instructions "may not be 
judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as 
a whole and the trial record:' Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting~ 
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Reviewing the instructions as a whole and 
considering them in the context of the trial record, Briggs failed to show that the 
instructional error he alleged clearly misled the jury into believing that he could be 
convicted of second degree stalking based on a course of conduct that was anything 
other than nonconsensual. Briggs therefore failed to establish fundamental error. 
Finally, even assuming a clear constitutional violation, Briggs is unable to show 
prejudice resulting from the magistrate's omission of "nonconsensual contact' from its 
definition for "course of conduct:' The evidence that Briggs engaged in nonconsensual 
contact was overwhelming. When Ms. Menear broke-up with Briggs she tried to end all 
contact with him, keeping her location a secret. (Tr., p.46, L.2-p.47, L.11; p.48, L.6-
p.49, L.6.) Briggs initially attempted to contact Ms. Menear through texting her friends 
and through numerous emails and MySpace messages. (Tr., p.50, Ls.1-8; p.51, Ls.5-
18; p.52, Ls.9-16.) Ms. Menear did not to respond to any of Briggs' messages. (Tr., 
p.52, Ls.17-22.) Briggs then called the residence where Ms. Menear was staying and 
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was told by another guest, James Dobson, that '1the owner] doesn't want him calling 
there anymore; that they donl like him, that they don't want him around:' (Tr., p.57, Ls.1-
12.) Ignoring that clear refusal of consent, Briggs then drove to the residence and, 
shouting outside the trailer, made several threats against James Dobson and Ms. 
Menear. (See Tr., p.57, L.23-p.60, L.17.) 
Briggs never argued that his attempts to contact Ms. Menear were consensual. 
In fact, Briggs acknowledged that James Dobson told him not to contact Ms. Menear. 
(Tr., p.141, L.13-p.142, L.4.) Briggs'defense was that he had legitimate purposes for 
trying to contact Ms. Menear, such as getting his clothes back, returning her phone, and 
trying to pass-on messages. (Tr., p.147, L.20-p.148, L.11; p.151, Ls.1-10). Briggs, 
however, never claimed that his contact with Ms. Menear was consensual. 
Where an omitted element is ''uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error," the 
error in the omission of the element is harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 
(1999), quoted in Draper, 151 Idaho at 291-92, 261 P.3d at 868-69; see also Perry, 150 
Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. If the omission of an element constitutes harmless error 
where it is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, surely the omission 
of a mere definition also constitutes harmless error when uncontested and supported by 
overwhelming evidence. Because there was overwhelming evidence of nonconsensual 
contact and Briggs never disputed that aspect of the state's case, Briggs failed to show 
that he was prejudiced by the magistrate's omission of "nonconsensual contact' from its 
definition for "course of conduct' in the jury instructions. Briggs therefore failed to 
establish fundamental error. 
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Having failed to establish fundamental error, Briggs has failed to show any basis 
for reversal of the magistrate courfs denial of his motion for a new trial. The district 
courfs order affirming the magistrate's denial of Brigg's motion for a new trial should 
therefore be affirmed. 
II. 
Because Briggs Failed To Raise The Issue Of Fundamental Error In The Lack Of A Jury 
Instruction Defining "Constitutionally Protected Activity' To The Intermediate Appellate 
Court, It Is Waived On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Briggs argues that the magistrate court committed fundamental error by not 
defining what constituted "constitutionally protected activity' in the jury instructions. 
(Appellanfs brief, pp.18-24.) Briggs failed to present this argument to the district court 
acting in its intermediate appellate court capacity. Because Briggs failed to present this 
argument before the intermediate appellate court, he has waived it. In the alternative, 
Briggs' argument appears to be a recasting of Briggs' failed argument presented to the 
district court challenging the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-7906. (See R., 
pp.178-84.) Any portions of the argument that were presented to the district court still 
fail, however, because they were not preserved before the magistrate court and Briggs 
failed to establish fundamental error on appeal. 
B. Any Instructional Challenge Based On The Magistrate Courfs Failure To Define 
'Constitutionally Protected Activity' In The Jury Instructions Is Waived 
Before a party may assert an issue on appeal, the party is required to seek a 
specific ruling on that issue at each stage of the appeal:' Rammell v. Idaho State Dept. 
of Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415,421,210 P.3d 523,529 (2009) (superseded on other 
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grounds by statute). 'On an appeal from the district court sitting as an intermediate 
appellate court, this Court will not consider issues that were not raised before the district 
court even if those issues had been raised in the magistrate court:' State v. Doe, 144 
Idaho 819, 822, 172 P.3d 1094, 1097 (2007). See also Montgomery v. Montgomery, 
147 Idaho 1, 10, 205 P.3d 650, 659 (2009) (This Court will not address an issue not 
raised before the district court sitting in its appellate capacity:'); Stonecipher v. 
Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731,737,963 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1998) ('It is well settled that an 
issue is not preserved for review by this Court even though it was raised before the 
magistrate when the issue is not raised later before the district court in the intermediate 
appeal:'), quoted in Kraly v. Kraly. 147 Idaho 299, 304, 208 P.3d 281, 286 (2009). 
Briggs failed to present to the district court acting in its appellate capacity his 
argument that the magistrate court committed fundamental error by not defining 
't:onstitutionally protected activity' in the jury instructions. (R., pp.171-84.) Rather, the 
only issues Briggs presented to the district court were whether the magistrate court's 
error in omitting "nonconsensual contact' from its definition for 't:ourse of conduct' 
constituted harmless error, whether Idaho Code § 18-7906 was facially unconstitutional 
or unconstitutional as applied to Briggs, and whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support Briggs' conviction. (See R., p.173.) Because Briggs failed to present to the 
district court acting in its intermediate appellate capacity the issue he now raises on 
appeal, the issue is waived and should not be considered by this Court on appeal. 
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C. Briggs Failed To Preserve His Challenge To The Constitutionality Of Idaho Code 
§ 18-7906 In The Trial Court And Briggs Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
On appeal to the district court, Briggs raised a claim that Idaho Code§ 18-7906 
was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Briggs. (R., pp.178-84.) Briggs 
may attempt to argue that, though altered on appeal to this Court, Briggs' argument is 
really just a recasting of this failed argument from below. (Compare R., pp.178-84 with 
Appellanfs brief, pp.18-24.) Insofar as Briggs challenges the constitutionality of Idaho 
Code § 18-7906, his challenge still fails because he failed to preserve any such 
challenge before the magistrate court below and he has failed to establish fundamental 
error on appeal. 
'An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal:' State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors 
in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ('No party may assign as error the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the 
grounds of the objection:); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely 
objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the 
fundamental error doctrine. !SL see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 
961,979 (2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine required Briggs to demonstrate the 
error he alleged: "(1) violate[d] one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
plainly exist[ed] (without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
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decision); and (3) was not harmless:' Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Idaho 
Code § 18-7906 does not clearly violate an unwaived constitutional right; therefore 
Briggs has failed to establish fundamental error. 
Briggs asserts that his emails, text messages, MySpace postings, and attempted 
contact with Ms. Menear by phone constitute protected speech in the absence of true 
threats or intimidation. (Appellanfs brief, pp.23-24.) Briggs fails to recognize that the 
unobjected to testimony at trial established that Briggs' messages were threatening (see 
Tr., p.49, L.20-p.50, L.14), and thus unprotected speech even under Briggs' proffered 
standard. Furthermore, as noted above, Briggs sent several texts to Ms. Menears 
'friends and numerous emails and MySpace messages to her. (Tr., p.50, Ls.1-8; p.51, 
Ls.5-18; p.52, Ls.9-16.) Briggs called the residence where Ms. Menear was staying and 
was told to stop calling. (Tr., p.57, Ls.1-12.) Briggs then drove to the residence and 
yelled several threats at James Dobson and Ms. Menear, causing her to fear for her 
safety. (See Tr., p.57, L.23-p.60, L.17.) This conduct, without regard to the content of 
Briggs' speech, is clearly prohibited under Idaho Code§ 18-7906 and, contrary to Briggs' 
assertions, is not subject to First Amendment protections. 
While the First Amendment affords great protections to the content of speech, 
those protections are not infringed on by content neutral, narrowly tailored statutes that 
merely restrict the time, place, and manner for speech, leaving open other avenues for 
expression. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Idaho Code§ 18-7906 
does not seek to police the content of speech, nor does it infringe on the speakers 
constitutional rights. Rather, it merely restricts the time, place, and manner of speech in 
a narrow, content neutral way, prohibiting engaging '1n a course of conduct' that 
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"knowingly and maliciously" seeks to inflict emotional distress, seriously alarm, harass, 
or "cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury." I.C. § 18-7906. 
The conduct that the statute restricts is not constitutionally protected and therefore 
application of the statute to Briggs' conduct does not violate any of Briggs' unwaived 
constitutional rights. Having failed to show the violation of an unwaived constitutional 
right, Briggs has failed to establish fundamental error. 
The district court was therefore correct in its holding that the issue Briggs raised 
on appeal was unpreserved, and this issue should not be considered on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Briggs' conviction. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 2012. 
(R~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
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